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CIVIL FORFEITURE AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN PUNISHMENT IN THE
WAKE OF AUSTIN v. UNITED STATES
STEVEN F. POE*
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."1
INTRODUCTION
Donald Coulter had no idea what the federal government could
do to him.2 He was growing a small amount of marijuana in his back
yard when one day a sheriff's deputy and federal marshals came to his
home and arrested him. 3 The state of Ohio found Donald Coulter
guilty of a criminal offense, his punishment being a $1,000 fine and 100
hours of community service. 4 The federal government, on the other
hand, sought mere civil sanctions. The feds wanted Donald Coulter's
$50,000 home.5
Kenneth Jafee of Jackson County, Oregon, was also arrested for
growing marijuana in his back yard. 6 The small marijuana plants had
a value of less than $1,000.7 However, through the power of civil for-
feiture, the federal government was able to step in and seize Mr.
Jafee's home and property worth almost $100,000.8
Rosemarie Santora was charged with possession of less than three
grams of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. 9 In addition
to imposing criminal punishment upon Mrs. Santora, the federal gov-
* Third year law student at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
1. U.S. CONSTr. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
2. Stephanie Saul, A House Could Be the Price of a Joint Under Federal Asset-Seizure Law,








9. United States v. 26,075 Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1008-09 (E.D.N.C. 1988), modified sub
nom. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ernment took her family home and property valued at over
$100,000.10
The situations described above reflect the often excessive nature
of government civil seizures prior to the summer of 1993. Before this
time, such seizures-often labeled civil forfeitures or statutory in rem
forfeitures-were not thought to be "fines" within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment." However, the United States Supreme Court
came to the opposite conclusion in Austin v. United States.' 2 In Aus-
tin, the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment serves to limit civil forfeitures that are punitive in
any respect. 13 Thus, if a civil forfeiture statute serves in part to punish
the owner of seized property, all government seizures under that law
are considered to be "fines" within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment.' 4 Accordingly, the Constitution dictates that these property
seizures must not be excessive. The Supreme Court did not, however,
outline a standard to be used or list factors to be considered by the
lower courts that must decide whether these government seizures are
indeed unconstitutionally excessive.' 5
This Note supports the use of the principle of proportionality for
determining whether civil seizures of property are unconstitutionally
excessive.' 6 Part I of this Note outlines the Supreme Court's opinion
in Austin.17 Part II examines the relationship between the Austin
Court's reasoning and the reasoning found in past Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and argues that it is this relationship that provides the
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. Plat 20 Lot 17, Great
Harbor Neck, 960 F.2d 200, 206-07 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. 3097 S.W. 111th Ave., 921
F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1991).
12. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
13. Id. at 2812.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See also Ron Champoux, Note, Real Property Forfeiture Under Federal Drug Laws:
Does the Punishment Outweigh the Crime?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247 (1992) (pre-Austin
Note supporting proportionality review of seizures pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)); James B.
Speta, Note, Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial Connection
and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1990) (suggesting that Eighth Amendment
protections should apply to government seizures without regard to whether the seizures are clas-
sified as criminal or civil). Cf Sandra Guerra, Reconciling Federal Asset Forfeitures and Drug
Offense Sentencing, 78 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1994) (advocating that Congress and the judiciary
factor in the punitive nature of civil forfeitures when making criminal sentencing decisions);
Stacy J. Pollock, Note, Proportionality in Civil Forfeiture: Toward a Remedial Solution, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 456 (1994) (advocating Congressional enactment of a blanket proportionality
statute that would limit civil forfeitures).
17. See infra notes 27-76 and accompanying text.
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general test for determining whether a given civil forfeiture is exces-
sive and therefore unconstitutional-whether the value of the prop-
erty seized is "grossly disproportionate" to the property owner's
culpable conduct. 18 This test should apply to all civil forfeitures,
under both state and federal law, that serve at least in part to punish
the owner of the seized property. Part III addresses the Supreme
Court's decision in Harmelin v. Michigan,19 and concludes that the
decision, while modifying the mechanics of the proportionality test,
does not remove the test from an Eighth Amendment analysis.20 Part
IV of this Note explains why a proportionality test should be used
rather than the "close enough relationship" analysis2' that Justice
Scalia advocates. 22 Under the latter, a civil seizure of property would
be unconstitutionally excessive only if the seized property does not
have a close enough relationship to the committed offense. 23
Finally, Part V illustrates how the proportionality principle
works24 by applying it to the forfeiture statutes that were at issue in
Austin.25 This part outlines how the federal judiciary can use objec-
tive criteria, specifically the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,26 to place
an approximate "value" on the property owner's culpable conduct.
Judges can compare this "value" to the dollar value of the seized
property, and then determine whether the seizure is grossly dispropor-
tionate under the Excessive Fines Clause.
18. See infra notes 77-110 and accompanying text.
19. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
20. See infra notes 111-37 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
22. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 156-205 and accompanying text.
25. The statutes examined by the Austin Court were 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and § 881(a)(7).
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803. Section 881(a)(4) provides for government seizure of "[aill convey-
ances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to trans-
port, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment
of [controlled substances and paraphernalia]." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988). Section 881(a)(7)
provides for government seizure of
[a]ll real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold inter-
est) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements,
which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate
the commission of [listed drug offenses].
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
26. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1993) [hereinafter
SENTENCING GUMELINES]. Congress granted the United States Sentencing Commission author-




I. A USTIN v. UNITED STA TES
In Austin, the Supreme Court held that government seizures of
property that serve at least in part to punish the owner of the seized
property are considered "fines" within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.27 Accordingly, the Court held that these seizures must
not be excessive or they will be unconstitutional. 28 The Court re-
manded the case to the lower court to determine whether the civil
seizure in Austin was excessive. 29 The Court cited "prudence" in de-
ciding not to outline a test to be used by the judiciary for determining
whether a civil seizure of property is excessive. 30
In Austin, Keith Engebretson, a government informant, agreed to
purchase cocaine from Richard Lyle Austin at Austin's auto body
shop in June of 1990.31 Austin went to his mobile home, then returned
and sold Engebretson the illegal drugs. 32 Austin's mobile home and
body shop were searched the next day by state law-enforcement of-
ficers.33 The officers recovered a revolver, some marijuana, $3,300 in
cash, and some drug paraphernalia from the body shop. 34 In addition,
the officers recovered a scale, a small bag of cocaine, some marijuana,
and $660 in cash from the mobile home.35 After Austin pleaded guilty
in state court to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute, the federal government attempted to seize Austin's mobile
home and body shop through the power of civil forfeiture. 36 The gov-
ernment brought this statutory in rem action in the United States Dis-
trict Court under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). 37
The District Court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment. 38 Austin appealed the ruling, arguing that the forfeiture vi-
olated the Eighth. Amendment, specifically the Excessive Fines
Clause.39 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
27. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
28. it.
29. Id.
30. Id. ("Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider that question in the
first instance.").
31. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 815 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Austin
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 815-16.
35. Id. at 816.
36. ld.
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affirmed the District Court's ruling. o However, the court also stated
that it "reluctantly agree[d] with the government" in this case.4' The
court explained that the principle of proportionality in punishment
was a "deeply rooted concept in the common law" and, in respect to
fairness, "should be applied in civil actions that result in harsh penal-
ties."'42 Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit deferred to the judgment of
the Ninth Circuit,43 which had held that the Constitution does not re-
quire courts to conduct a proportionality analysis to determine
whether a civil seizure of property is excessive. 44
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals'
decision.45 The Court held that forfeitures under § 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7) are subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment. 46 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
first noted that the purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause is to put a
limit on the government's power to punish people.4 7 The Court stated
that this power to punish can manifest itself in civil proceedings as
well as in criminal proceedings. 4s Emphasizing that government sanc-
tions often serve multiple purposes, the Court noted that it merely
had to determine whether the instant forfeiture statutes served at least
in part to punish the owner of property.
49
Writing for the Court,50 Justice Blackmun examined the history
of forfeiture and determined that civil forfeitures traditionally have
40. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d at 815.
41. Id. at 817.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 817-18. The court cited United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989), as support for its holding. See supra notes 6-8 and
accompanying text. The 300 Cove Rd court relied on the traditional distinction between in rem
and in personam forfeitures in holding that the Eighth Amendment does not require a propor-
tionality analysis for in rem forfeitures. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d at 234-35; see also infra part IV.
44. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d at 234-35.
45. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).
46. Id. at 2805.
47. Id. at 2805. Prior to Austin in Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909 (1989), the Court noted that, fines being one version of punishment in the United States,
the "Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit... those fines directly imposed by, and paya-
ble to, the government." Id. at 2916.
48. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805-06 ("'The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand
it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law.'... 'It is commonly understood
that civil proceedings may advance punitive and remedial goals ... ') (quoting United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989)).
49. Id. at 2806. See also Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 ("[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.").
50. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices White, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Souter joined. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2802. Justice Scalia filed a separate opinion,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id. In addition, Justice Kennedy filed an
19941
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been used by the government, at least in part, to punish the owner of
the property.51 More specifically, the Court examined § 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7) to determine whether these two civil forfeiture provisions serve
to punish the property owner.52 Citing the innocent owner provisions
of § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7),5 3 the statutory requirement of a connection
between the forfeitable property and the commission of a drug of-
fense, 54 and the legislative histories of the two subsections,5 5 the Court
concluded that both subsections serve, in part at least, to punish the
owner of the seized property.56 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that forfeitures pursuant to § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are "subject to the
limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. '57
However, the Court chose not to outline the exact limitations imposed
by the Clause.58 The Court remanded the case, effectively leaving it to
the lower courts to develop the standards for determining whether a
given government seizure is unconstitutionally excessive.
5 9
In light of the Court's opinion, a statute that serves purely reme-
dial purposes does not levy a "fine," and thus is not subject to the
Excessive Fines Clause.60 A statute which is not punitive in any re-
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas joined. Id.
51. Id. at 2810. See also Arthur W. Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An
Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 246-49 (1994)
(summarizing the history of civil forfeiture); Tamara R. Prety, Scorched Earth: How the Expan-
sion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MiAMi L. REV. 911, 927-
42 (1991) (providing a more detailed review of the history of civil forfeiture).
52. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810-11.
53. Sections 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) both contain innocent owner provisions. For example,
§ 881(a)(4)(C) provides that "no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the ex-
tent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1988). In addition, § 881(a)(7) provides that "no property
shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowl-
edge or consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).
55. In 1984 Congress added subsection (a)(7) to § 881. In doing so Congress acknowledged
"that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or
punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs." S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 191 (1983).
56. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811-12.
57. Id. at 2812.
58. Id.
59. The Court cited "prudence" in deciding to allow the lower courts to formulate this test.
Id. (construing Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1534 (1992)). But see id. at 2814-15
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (setting forth a standard for deter-
mining when civil forfeitures are unconstitutionally excessive).
60. Id. at 2811-12. The Court noted that "it appears to make little practical difference
whether the Excessive FImes Clause applies to all forfeitures under § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) or only
to those that cannot be characterized as purely remedial. The Clause prohibits only the imposi-
[Vol. 70:237
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spect, but serves only to remove instruments of illegal activity from
society or to compensate the government for the costs of law enforce-
ment 6' could be classified as purely remedial. For two reasons, the
Court found that § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) do not fit into either one of
these remedial categories. First, the Court refused to characterize
personal property such as automobiles and mobile homes as "'instru-
ments' of the drug trade." 62 Second, the Court noted that the value of
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) forfeitures can vary dramatically.63 Because
the value of the property forfeited may have no correlation to the cost
of law enforcement, the statutes do not compensate the government
for this cost.64 Forfeitures under these statutes, therefore, are partly
punitive and are subject to the purview of the Excessive Fines Clause.
The lower federal courts and the state courts are now left with the
tasks of determining (1) whether a particular civil forfeiture statute
serves, in any manner, to punish the owner of the seized property
(which would make a seizure pursuant to that statute a government
imposed fine) and if so, (2) whether a government seizure under such
a statute is unconstitutionally excessive. The Supreme Court has al-
ready resolved the first issue with respect to § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7),
clearly holding that both subsubsections partly serve to punish.65 In
addition, even though the Court has not resolved the first issue for
other forfeiture statutes, it has provided the lower courts with gui-
dance. Specifically, the Austin Court concluded that "forfeiture gen-
erally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have
been understood, partly at least, as punishment."6 Moreover, the
Court examined § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) and listed the characteristics
that led to their classification as partly punitive in nature.67 However,
tion of 'excessive' fines, and a fine that serves purely remedial purposes cannot be considered
'excessive' in any event." Id at 2812 n.14 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
61. Id. at 2811, 2812 n.14 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). In fact, § 881(a)(1) provides
that the federal government may seize "Call controlled substances which have been manufac-
tured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1)
(1988). This subsection of the statute could logically be classified as this first type of purely
remedial forfeiture provision. See also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. 354, 364 (1984) (recognizing that the forfeiture of contraband may be considered remedial
because it removes dangerous instruments of illegal activity from society); One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (recognizing that the forfeiture of goods in-
volved in customs violations may be considered a form of "liquidated damages").
62. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811. See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693, 699 (1965) ("There is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile.").
63. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
64. Id
65. See id. at 2810-11.
66. Id at 2810.
67. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
19941
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the Court refused to give any guidance for the second issue, whether a
given forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive.
68
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Scalia addressed the
second issue by advancing what he considered to be the standard for
determining when a seizure is excessive. 69 Citing the common law dis-
tinction between in rem forfeitures and standard monetary fines, Jus-
tice Scalia stated that the standards for determining whether they are
excessive should also be different.70 Justice Scalia acknowledged that
for standard monetary fines, and possibly for in personam (or crimi-
nal) forfeitures, the value of the forfeiture should be proportionate to
the committed offense. 71 However, with in rem forfeitures the test
should be whether the forfeited property has "a close enough relation-
ship to the offense." 7
2
Justice Scalia's conclusion rests on the traditional in rem notion
that the property has committed the offense and accordingly is
tainted, or guilty, because of its unlawful use.73 The court in United
States v. Sandin"74 touched on the basis for Justice Scalia's conclusion
as it described what it perceived to be the differences between civil
and criminal forfeiture. The Sandini court stated:
Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. The property is the defend-
ant in the case, and the burden of proof rests on the party alleging
ownership. The innocence of the owner is irrelevant-it is enough
that the property was involved in a violation to which forfeiture at-
taches .... In contrast, criminal or in personam forfeiture differs
because its prime objective is punishment of the owner. The owner
or possessor of the property is the defendant, and the burden of
proof falls on the government. 75
68. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
69. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). The majority, however, neither endorsed nor rejected Justice Scalia's proposed standard:
Justice Scalia suggests that the sole measure of an in rem forfeiture's excessiveness is
the relationship between the forfeited property and the offense.... We do not rule out
the possibility that the connection between the property and the offense may be rele-
vant, but our decision today in no way limits the Court of Appeals from considering
other factors in determining whether the forfeiture of Austin's property was excessive.
Id at 2812 n.15.
70. Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Well-
established common-law distinctions should not be swept away .....
71. Id. at 2814-15.
72. Id. at 2815.
73. Id ("[S]tatutory in rem forfeitures have traditionally been fixed, not by determining the
appropriate value of the penalty in relation to the committed offense, but by determining what
property has been 'tainted' by unlawful use .... Was ... the property, under traditional stan-
dards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable?").
74. United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 873.
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As this Note explains, this traditional distinction between in rem
(civil) and in personam (criminal) forfeiture is at odds with the Court's
reasoning in Austin. Thus, this distinction should not provide the
foundation for building a test to determine whether a given civil
seizure is unconstitutionally excessive. Rather, the test should be
based on the constitutional principle that the offender's punishment
should never be grossly disproportionate to the offender's culpable
conduct.
76
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
IN PUNISHMENT
The principle of proportionality should dictate whether a civil
forfeiture is excessive within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
Under the principle of proportionality, a seizure of property pursuant
to a punitive civil forfeiture statute would be unconstitutional if the
value of the property seized is grossly disproportionate to the culpable
conduct of the property owner.
The basis for the principle of proportionality in this context is
found in the relationship between the Austin opinion and prior Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. The Austin Court concluded that
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) forfeitures were fines within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment because seizures under these provisions consti-
tuted "payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense.
'77
The presence of deterrent and retributive qualities in these federal
forfeiture statutes was central to the Court's reasoning.78 Indeed, if
the statutes were purely remedial in nature, seizures pursuant to the
statutes would not be subject to the Eighth Amendment.79 Thus, it is
the punitive nature of civil forfeiture statutes that brings the Excessive
Fines Clause into play. Furthermore, a review of past Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence' including Solem v. Helm ° and Harmelin v. Michi-
gan,8' reveals that the Amendment mandates that the government
may not impose criminal punishment upon an individual when the
punishment is "grossly disproportionate" to the individual's pro-
scribed conduct. Because punishment is common to both criminal
76. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). But see infra note 115 and accompanying
text.
77. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (emphasis added).
78. See iL at 2811.
79. See id. at 2812 n.14.
80. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
81. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
1994]
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sentencing and, generally, civil forfeiture, the principle of proportion-
ality should apply to both.
In Solem v. Helm the Supreme Court outlined why the propor-
tionality principle should apply to criminal sentencing. The Court re-
viewed the sentence of a South Dakota man, Helm, who had been
sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole after he had
been convicted of writing a bad check for $100.82 The ordinary pun-
ishment for this offense was increased in Helm's case because he had
previously been convicted of six felonies-three convictions for bur-
glary and separate convictions for obtaining money under false pre-
tenses, grand larceny, and his third offense for driving while
intoxicated.83 The Court held that this sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.8n
In arriving at this decision the Court noted that "[t]he principle
that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply
rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. '85 In
addition, the Court noted that when the Framers wrote the Eighth
Amendment, they adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights
and thus adopted the English principle of proportionality.86 Finally,
the Court concluded that "[t]he constitutional principle of proportion-
ality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a cen-
tury. ' 87 Thus, the Court held "that a criminal sentence must be
proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been con-
victed."' 88 This holding reinforced the Court's position that "no pen-
alty is per se constitutional. '89
Interestingly, the Solem Court indicated that the principle of pro-
portionality may be even more appropriately understood as part of
the Excessive Fines Clause than it is as part of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. The Court seemed to accept, without need for
82. Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-83.
83. Id. at 280-82. Helm was subjected to a South Dakota recidivist statute that read as
follows: "When a defendant has been convicted of at least three prior convictions [sic] in addi-
tion to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to the sen-
tence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
84. Solem, 493 U.S. at 303.
85. Id. at 284.
86. Id at 285-86. "The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in
language that was later adopted in the Eighth Amendment: 'excessive Baile ought not to be
required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted."' ld at 285
(quoting 1 W. & M., ch.2 (1689)).
87. Id. at 286. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
88. Solem, 493 U.S. at 290.
89. Id.
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further elaboration, that the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause
require a proportionality analysis:
We have recognized that the Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel
limitations" on bail, fines, and other punishments.... and the text is
explicit that ... fines may not be excessive. It would be anomalous
indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine and the greater punishment
of death were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not.90
The Austin Court's holding is based on the notion that civil for-
feitures are generally penalties that serve to punish, even though they
are labeled "civil" as opposed to "criminal." The Austin Court rea-
soned that, because the forfeiture statutes at issue in that case were of
a "punitive nature," the Excessive Fines Clause applied.91 The Court
noted additionally that "[t]he notion of punishment, as we commonly
understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the crimi-
nal law."' 92 Consequently, because a punitive civil seizure is consid-
ered to be punishment-just as a criminal sentence is considered to be
punishment-the contours of the Excessive Fines Clause should also
incorporate the Solem principle of proportionality.
A few federal appellate courts have already applied the Solem
proportionality test to both criminal and civil forfeitures. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the Solem proportional-
ity principle applies to in personam forfeitures in the RICO (Racke-
teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) area.93 The court held
that the property interest forfeited must not be so "grossly dispropor-
tionate" to the offense committed as to violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's Excessive Fines Clause.94 The Third Circuit has also
recognized that in personam forfeitures under RICO may not be
grossly disproportionate to the crime in question.95
90. I& at 289 (emphasis added).
91. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993). The Court considered government
seizures pursuant to either one of the subsections to be "payment[s] to a sovereign as punish-
ment for some offense." Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 265 (1989)).
92. Id. at 2805.
93. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987). In Busher, the court remanded
the case to the District Court for a determination as to whether the forfeiture of defendant's
interest in two businesses and certain real estate violated the Eighth Amendment's guarantee
against grossly disproportional punishment. Id. at 1414-16.
94. Id. at 1415.
95. United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1993). In Sarbello, the defendant was
convicted of multiple RICO violations. Id. at 718-19. In addition, the trial court found that the
defendant must forfeit his entire interest in a manufacturing company. Id. at 719. The Court of
Appeals, however, remanded the case so that the District Court could determine whether the
forfeiture was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 728.
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More on point, the Second Circuit cited Solem and held that even
civil forfeitures may violate the Eighth Amendment, stating that the
Amendment "prevents the imposition of a punishment which is
'grossly disproportionate' to the crime committed." 96 However, giv-
ing great weight to the seriousness of the multiple drug offenses in its
case at bar, the court did not find that the forfeiture was an example
of an Eighth Amendment violation. 97
In its original form, the Solem proportionality test included an
examination of three relatively objective criteria.98 First, the Supreme
Court held that a reviewing court should compare the gravity of the
offense to the harshness of the penalty.99 Second, the court should
compare the penalty imposed in its case to the penalties imposed on
other offenders in the same jurisdiction.'0° Third, the court should
compare the penalty imposed in its case to the penalties imposed for
the same or similar conduct in other jurisdictions. 101 The Solem Court
reasoned that these criteria, used together, could prevent Eighth
Amendment violations, while also preventing the judiciary from mak-
ing ad hoc, subjective judgments about how long criminal sentences
should be.10 2
The first criterion in the original Solem proportionality review is a
comparison of the gravity of the offense to the harshness of the pen-
alty.10 3 In determining the gravity of the offense, a court should ex-
amine "the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and
the culpability of the offender."' 1 4 The harm caused or threatened to
the victim or society can be measured by various factors: the absolute
magnitude of the offense (e.g., ten grams of cocaine as opposed to five
grams), the violent or non-violent nature of the offense, and the gen-
eral seriousness of the offense (e.g., attempted crimes versus com-
96. United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 1992). In 38 Whalers
Cove Drive, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance.
hi at 32. The federal government seized the defendant's condominium pursuant to § 881(a)(7).
Id. The court held that, despite the civil nature of the forfeiture, the forfeiture was so "over-
whelmingly disproportionate compared to the value of the relevant drug transactions" that there
was a "rebuttable presumption" that the forfeiture was punitive. Id. at 37. However, the court
held that, even though the forfeiture was punitive, it was not violative of the Eighth Amend-
ment. id. at 39.
97. Id. at 39.
98. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983).
99. Id. at 290-91.
100. Id. at 291.
101. Id. at 291-92.
102. See id. at 290 n.17.
103. Id. at 292.
104. Id.
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pleted crimes). 1 5 The culpability of the offender can be measured by
the level of intent with which the offender is charged (e.g., purposeful
conduct versus reckless conduct) and the offender's motive.
10 6
The second criterion is a comparison of the penalty imposed on
the individual before the court to the penalties imposed on other of-
fenders in the same jurisdiction.107 For example, if the penalty im-
posed on the individual before the court is much greater than
penalties consistently imposed on other offenders in the same jurisdic-
tion for more serious offenses, the court may consider the possibility
that the instant penalty is unconstitutionally excessive.
The third criterion is a comparison of the penalty imposed on the
individual before the court to the penalties imposed in other jurisdic-
tions for the commission of the same or similar offense.1 08 For exam-
ple, if the penalty imposed on the individual before the court was
much greater than the penalties imposed in other jurisdictions for very
similar offenses, the court may have more evidence that the instant
penalty is unconstitutionally excessive. The Solem Court noted that
no single criterion was determinative.' °9 Accordingly, each of the
three should be considered when performing such constitutional
review.
After Solem, however, the Court issued a fragmented, plurality
decision in Harmelin v. Michigan" that reshaped the contours of the
Solem proportionality analysis. Thus, before applying the principle of
proportionality to civil forfeitures, this Note will next outline the state
of the Solem proportionality test after Harmelin.
III. THE MODIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
A. Harmelin v. Michigan
In Harmelin, the petitioner was convicted in the state of Michigan
for cocaine possession and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life
in prison without possibility of parole."' After exhausting the Michi-
105. Id at 292-93.
106. Id. at 293.
107. Id. at 291.
108. Id. at 291-92.
109. Id. at 290 n.17 ("[N]o single criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly dispro-
portionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment.").
110. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
111. Id. at 961. The defendant was convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Id. At the
time of his conviction, Michigan law provided that the punishment for possessing more than 650
grams of cocaine was a mandatory life sentence. Id.; see Micm. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990-91).
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gan appeals process, the petitioner went before the United States
Supreme Court and asserted that his criminal punishment was "cruel
and unusual," and thus unconstitutional, because it was "significantly
disproportionate" to his crime.112 For differing reasons, a 5-4 majority
held that the petitioner's sentence was not cruel and unusual under
the Eighth Amendment. 113
No majority opinion was issued in Harmelin. In fact, the Court
published five separate opinions, including three dissenting opin-
ions."x4 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote that
the Eighth Amendment contains no guarantee of proportional punish-
ment. 1 5 Rather, the Amendment prohibits only cruel and unusual
"modes" of punishment, for example, disemboweling or burning
alive. 116 In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Scalia stated that Solem
was incorrectly decided and should be overruled." 17
Justice Kennedy issued a concurring opinion, in which Justices
Souter and O'Connor joined.118 These justices agreed with the ulti-
mate decision of Justice Scalia that the punishment imposed on
Harmelin did not violate the Eighth Amendment. However, these
justices disagreed with Justice Scalia's reasoning. Justice Kennedy
stated that the Eighth Amendment does prohibit sentences that are
grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.119 Thus, Solem
should not be overruled. Instead, the Solem test should be modified
so that it mandates only the use of the first of its three prongs. 20 The
latter two prongs are only analytical tools that should be used "in the
rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and
the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportional-
ity.' 2' Justice Kennedy applied this first Solem prong and concluded
that Harmelin's sentence was not grossly disproportionate and thus
not cruel and unusual.
122
112. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961.
113. Id. at 996.
114. Id. at 960.
115. ld. at 965.
116. Id. at 976.
117. Id. at 986-90.
118. Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
119. Id. at 997.
120. Id. at 1004-05.
121. Id. at 1005.
122. Id. at 1006-09.
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Each of the four dissenting justices agreed with Justice White's
dissenting opinion. 123 Justice White argued that the full Solem test,
with each of its three prongs, should be applied in this case. 124 In
Justice White's view, the application of this test resulted in the conclu-
sion that the petitioner's sentence was grossly disproportionate to the
crime he had committed.125
B. The McGruder Interpretation of Harmelin
Since Harmelin provided no clear guidance, the lower courts
were left with the task of determining whether a proportionality prin-
ciple still exists under the Eighth Amendment, and if it does, whether
the principle still exists in the form of the Solem three-prong test. The
most widely adopted interpretation of the Harmelin opinion among
the Circuit Courts of Appeals is the Fifth Circuit's interpretation
found in McGruder v. Puckett.126 This interpretation, which recog-
nizes the continued existence of the proportionality principle, is based
on a "head-count analysis" of Harmelin.127
By applying a head-count analysis, we find that seven members of
the Court supported a continued Eighth Amendment guaranty
against disproportional sentences. Only four justices, however, sup-
ported the continued application of all three factors in Solem, and
five justices rejected it. Thus, this much is clear: disproportionality
survives; Solem does not. Only Justice Kennedy's opinion reflects
that view. It is to his opinion, therefore, that we turn for
direction.128
A proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment accordingly
would first involve "a threshold comparison" of the gravity of the of-
fense to the severity of the punishment. 129 A court should only con-
123. Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting) and 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun
and Stevens joined in Justice White's dissenting opinion. Id at 1009. Justice Stevens, however,
wrote separately in order to provide an additional comment. Id. at 1028. He stated that, since
the punishment in this case was life imprisonment, extra scrutiny of the punishment is required.
Id. For such a penalty to stand, the criminal conduct must be "so atrocious that society's interest
in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform or rehabilitation."
Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Justice Mar-
shall agreed with Justice White's opinion, but wrote his own opinion in order to express his view
that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment in all circumstances. Id. at 1027.
124. Id at 1016-21.
125. Id. at 1021 ("Application of the Solem factors to the statutorily mandated punishment at
issue here reveals that the punishment fails muster under Solem and, consequently, under the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.").
126. 954 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Morse, 983 F.2d 851 (8th Cir.
1993); United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1992); McCullough v. Singletary, 967
F.2d 530 (11th Cir. 1992); Tart v. Massachusetts, 949 F.2d 490 (1st Cir. 1991).





sider the second and third prongs of Solem when the threshold
comparison leads the court to infer that the punishment is grossly dis-
proportionate to the offense. 130 In light of the wide acceptance of the
McGruder interpretation-and more importantly, five Justices' rejec-
tion of the continued initial application of all three of the Solem
prongs-courts should use this modified version of the Solem propor-
tionality test when determining whether a civil seizure of property is
an excessive fine.
13'
C. The Application of the Principle to Civil Forfeitures
Of course the modified Solem proportionality test will have to be
tailored to fit the specific contours of civil forfeiture. As announced in
Solem and modified in Harmelin, the proportionality test applies to
prison sentence lengths, not property seizure values. However, this
difference should not be an insurmountable hurdle. The fundamental
purpose of the test, maintaining proportionality in punishment, ap-
plies directly to the civil forfeiture context. 32
The modified Solem test requires a judicial determination of the
gravity of the offense. The test also requires a comparison of the grav-
ity of the offense to the harshness of the penalty. The Ninth Circuit
has already performed these two tasks in their review of an in per-
sonam forfeiture in the RICO area.133 The court noted that, when
determining the gravity of the offense, the court can examine the same
considerations in a civil forfeiture proceeding that it does in a criminal
sentencing proceeding. 134 The court should look at the harm suffered
by the victim or society and the culpability of the offender. 135 For
example, with an illegal drug sale, the courts can consider the dollar
value of the drugs sold, the amount of harm caused to society through
dissemination of the drugs, and whether the property owner was the
130. Id.
131. Interestingly, even if Justice Scalia's opinion in Harmelin had been a majority opinion,
the complete (although hypothetical) overruling of Solem would arguably not eviscerate Solem's
usefulness in the civil forfeiture area. Harmelin would have only overruled Solem's proportion-
ality prongs as to their use in a Cruel and Unusual Punishments analysis. See Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The Court has already indicated that the Excessive Fines Clause may
require a proportionality analysis simply because of the nature of the word "excessive." See
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
133. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. 429 S.
Main St., 843 F. Supp. 337, 341-42 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (post-Austin decision finding that
§ 881(a)(7) civil seizure of property valued at just over $83,000 was not grossly disproportionate
when balanced against conduct which involved repeated illegal drug sales).
134. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415.
135. Id.
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purposeful seller of the drugs or merely an owner of property who had
knowledge of drug sales being performed on the property.' 36
The comparison of the gravity of the offense to the harshness of
the penalty should also not pose new problems for the judiciary. The
penalty has merely changed forms. Rather than comparing the culpa-
bility of the offender to a sentence length, with civil forfeitures the
courts will be comparing the culpability of the offender to the value of
seized property. Courts should use this comparison to draw a line be-
tween legal and excessive seizures. "This is, admittedly, not an easy
line to draw; the eighth amendment does not provide a bright line
separating punishment that is permissible from that which is not. But
a court may not turn its back on a constitutional constraint simply
because it is difficult to apply."'1 37 As recognized by the Busher court,
Eighth Amendment line drawing is difficult. However, these lines
should prove to be no more difficult to draw in the context of civil
forfeiture than they already are in the context of criminal sentencing.
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA'S "CLOSE ENOUGH RELATIONSHIP" TEST
In his concurrence in Austin, however, Justice Scalia rejected the
use of the proportionality principle in the area of civil forfeitures. Be-
cause the common law distinguishes between in rem forfeitures and
standard monetary fines, Justice Scalia supports the use of a "close
enough relationship" test for in rem forfeitures, rather than a propor-
tionality test. He explains that
[u]nlike monetary fines, statutory in rem forfeitures have tradition-
ally been fixed, not by determining the appropriate value of the
penalty in relation to the committed offense, but by determining
what property has been "tainted" by unlawful use, to which issue
the value of the property is irrelevant .... The question is not how
much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated
property has a close enough relationship to the offense. 138
A simple hypothetical illustrates the difference between Justice
Scalia's approach and the proportionality approach. John Doe has
been arrested for illegal possession of marijuana. Prior to the arrest,
law enforcement personnel locate a few small marijuana plants on
Doe's land and a small baggie of marijuana in his automobile. The
land is determined to be worth over $350,000, while the automobile is
136. See id.
137. Id. at 1416.
138. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
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worth $10,000. The federal government has seized both the land and
the automobile pursuant to § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).
During the forfeiture proceeding, evidence is brought forth show-
ing that the marijuana plants were located in the middle of the prop-
erty. In addition, the evidence suggests that Doe had been growing
the drug for only a few months. Surrounding the plants is a dense
forest that has arguably served to hide the marijuana plants from
view. The evidence also shows that the automobile was intended to
be used for only one isolated transaction, a gift of a few marijuana
cigarettes to one of Doe's friends. Growing the drug merely for his
own use, Doe has never attempted to give or sell marijuana to anyone
else before this date.
Under Justice Scalia's "close enough relationship" test, the court
could find that Doe's land is forfeitable but that his automobile is not.
The trees on the land may have hidden the marijuana plants from
view and permitted Doe to continue to grow and use the illegal drug.
As a result, the court could reasonably conclude that the land has a
"close enough relationship" to the offense of marijuana possession.
However, the automobile was used for only one isolated incident and
contained only a small amount of marijuana. Therefore, the court
could reasonably conclude that the automobile did not have such a
close relationship. 39
On the other hand, under the proportionality test, the court
would probably conclude that the automobile is forfeitable but that
the land is not. Under the first Solem prong, the court could reason-
ably find that the value of the automobile, $10,000, is not grossly dis-
proportionate to the "value" of this drug offense. However, the court
would probably find that the value of the land, $350,000, is grossly
disproportionate to the "value" of this relatively minor drug offense.
In order to illustrate the "close enough relationship" test and dif-
ferentiate it from the proportionality principle, Justice Scalia set forth
his "gold scales" hypothetical in his Austin concurrence: "Scales used
to measure out unlawful drug sales, for example, are confiscable
whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal.1 40 According
to Justice Scalia, the gold scales are forfeitable because they have such
139. The Court explained that
an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth Amendment
permits if it applies to property that cannot properly be regarded as an instrumentality
of the offense-the building, for example, in which an isolated drug sale happens to
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a close relationship to the offense of drug selling.141 The scales are
"guilty" property, 42 and thus seizure of the scales would not violate
the Eighth Amendment. Justice Scalia notes that the value of the
scales-a determinative factor in a proportionality analysis-is an ir-
relevant factor in his analysis.143 However, in light of the majority's
requirement that a forfeiture statute must be punitive in at least some
respect for the Excessive Fines Clause to even apply, Justice Scalia's
gold scales may be completely forfeitable under both the proportion-
ality approach and the "close enough relationship" test. If the gold
scales were forfeited in a federal proceeding, most likely they would
have been seized pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(2) which permits
seizure of "[all ... equipment of any kind which [is] used ... in...
processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled sub-
stance."' 44 This portion of § 881 seems to be purely remedial in that it
serves to "remove the 'instruments' of the drug trade," and as such,
the Excessive Fines Clause would not even apply.' 45 Thus, the gold
scales would be forfeitable whether the proportionality approach or
the "close enough relationship" test is used.
There is no doubt that there are benefits to Justice Scalia's "close
enough relationship" approach. First, the judiciary would not be con-
cerned with valuing seized property. In addition, the courts would not
have to become involved with the more difficult task of placing a
"value" on the property owner's culpable conduct. Moreover, under
Justice Scalia's approach, modem civil forfeiture law would comport
logically with the common law, traditional notion of "guilty" prop-
erty. 46 Under the common law, in rem actions are pursued against
the property itself, not the owner of the property. 47 As such, the
"close enough relationship" test is quite logical. If the seized property




144. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(2) (1988).
145. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811. See also United States v. $45,140.00 Currency, 839 F. Supp.
556, 558 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (post-Austin decision finding that § 881(a)(6) forfeiture of cash proceeds
from illegal drug sale was purely remedial and did not implicate the Eighth Amendment);
United States v. Approximately 15,538 Panulirus Argus Lobster Tails, 834 F. Supp. 385, 391 n.10
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that forfeiture of illegally imported lobster tails was purely a remedial
measure because the lobster tails were contraband); State v. Meister, 866 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993) (post-Austin decision finding that forfeiture of cash proceeds from drug sale was
purely remedial).
146. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815 ("The relevant inquiry for an excessive forfeiture under § 881
is the relationship of the property to the offense: Was it close enough to render the property,
under traditional standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable?").
147. United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1987).
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feitable, regardless of the property's value.14s If the seized property is
unrelated to the offense, then the property is in no way "guilty."'1 49
Relying on the common law notion of "guilty" property, how-
ever, would merely be mechanical compliance with a traditional legal
fiction. 150 This fiction was created to expand the jurisdiction of the
courts, not to establish the basis for the limitations of the Eighth
Amendment.151 More importantly, this fiction is based on the tradi-
tional distinction between in rem and in personam forfeiture, a distinc-
tion which is at odds with the Austin majority's reasoning.
In Austin, the Court accepted that modem civil forfeiture laws
tend to impose punishment on the property owner, and that
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) definitely do impose such punishment. In the
majority opinion, the Court concluded that "statutory in rem forfeit-
ures in particular historically have been understood, at least in part, as
punishment."'1 52 In arriving at this conclusion the Court noted that,
since the creation of statutory in rem forfeiture, civil seizures have
been based on the property owner's culpable state of mind, not on the
idea that the property has actually done something wrong. 53 The
Austin Court explained that "the Court has understood this fiction [of
'guilty' property] to rest on the notion that the owner who allows his
property to become involved in an offense has been negligent.' 15 4
Since the Austin majority looked beyond the traditional legal fiction
of "guilty" property in deciding that the Excessive Fines Clause ap-
plies to punitive civil forfeitures, the lower courts should also look
beyond it when developing the test for determining when civil forfeit-
ures are excessive.'55
148. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815. See also Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 400
(1877) ("[T]he offence is attached primarily to the thing .... It is not an uncommon course...
to treat the [property] ... as the offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal mis-
conduct or responsibility of the owner ... .
149. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815.
150. See id. at 2808-09 n.9 ("The Government relies heavily on this fiction.... We do not
understand the Government to rely separately on the technical distinction between proceedings
in rem and proceedings in personam, but we note that any such reliance would be misplaced.").
151. Id. (citing Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, 559 (1992)). See also
Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 23 (1960) ("A purpose of the fiction,
among others, has been to allow actions against ships where a person owning the ship could not
be reached .... ).
152. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810.
153. Id. at 2808-10.
154. Id. at 2809.
155. See United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 1994) (expressing dis-
satisfaction with Justice Scalia's proposed standard for excessiveness). But see United States v.
427 & 429 Hall St., 842 F. Supp. 1421 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (predicting that the 11th Circuit Court of
Appeals will adopt Justice Scalia's test for excessiveness); In re King Properties, 635 A.2d 128
(Pa. 1993) (holding that, under the Excessive Fines provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
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V. APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES TO
FEDERAL CML FORFEITURE
In addition to supporting the use of the principle of proportional-
ity in judicial reviews of civil forfeitures, this Note outlines how the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines'5 6 can be used by the federal judiciary
as an objective tool in evaluating any of the Solem prongs. After a
brief introduction to the Sentencing Guidelines, Part V examines why
and how federal judges can use the Sentencing Guidelines to review
civil seizures pursuant to § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), even though the Sen-
tencing Guidelines were originally designed for use in the criminal
law.15
7
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Before November 1987 the Federal Government used a system of
indeterminate sentencing and parole to set and monitor the punish-
ment of federal criminals.' 58 Under this system, judges and parole of-
ficers had broad discretion in deciding how long an offender would
remain in custody,' 59 which often produced wide disparities in
sentences.' 60 In response to this and other concerns,' 6' Congress cre-
ated the United States Sentencing Commission and directed it to cre-
ate sentencing guidelines that would be binding (except in rare
instances) on federal courts.'
62
the excessiveness test is whether the seized property has a close enough relationship to the com-
mitted offense). In United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1994),
the court accepted the United States Supreme Court's invitation to develop an Eighth Amend-
ment test for excessiveness and held that both a proportionality analysis and a relationship test
should be applied.
156. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 26.
157. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 1 ("[The Commission's] principal pur-
pose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system
158. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). Under the old system of indetermi-
nate sentencing and parole, statutes specified the punishment for convicted criminals, but judges
had wide discretion to determine whether an individual would be incarcerated and, if so, for how
long. Id. In addition, a system of parole was used to guide and direct offenders back into soci-
ety. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 365.
161. Under the prior indeterminate sentencing system, a major goal was to promote rehabili-
tation. Id. at 363. Rehabilitation later became questioned, however, as a "sound penological
theory." Id. at 365; see also NORVALL MoRRis, THE FuTuRE OF IMPRISONMENr 28-43 (1974).
Congress reacted by rejecting rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)
(Supp. 1993). Instead, Congress endorsed retribution, education, deterrence, and incapacitation
as the goals of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
162. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365-67.
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The underlying purpose and basic mechanics of the Sentencing
Guidelines are effectively summarized by the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission in a Special Report to Congress.
163
Starting with the premise that treating similar offenses and similar
offenders alike forms the basis of a just and rational sentencing pol-
icy, the Sentencing Commission created guidelines that take into ac-
count both the seriousness of the offense, including relevant offense
characteristics, and important information about the offender, such
as the offender's role in the offense and prior record. Using this
information, the guidelines prescribe proportional individual
sentences that, for example, punish the recidivist criminal substan-
tially more than the first offender, and the organizer of a criminal
enterprise substantially more than his minions.164
The Sentencing Guidelines utilize what is basically a seven-step
process. First, the Sentencing Guidelines assign a generic base offense
level to each of the 2,000 separate criminal offenses in the federal
criminal law. 165 These generic offense levels number from four to
forty-three according to the proportionate severity of the crime. 16
6
After a federal court determines the base offense level, the second
task is to identify any characteristics specific to the offense that may
change the offense level. 167 For example, the Sentencing Guidelines
specific to robbery mandate a three-level increase if the offender pos-
sessed a firearm during the robbery.168 Third, the court will determine
if there are any generic adjustments that apply to the offender.169 For
example, these adjustments require that the offense level be increased
three levels if the victim was a law enforcement officer, regardless of
the specific offense at issue.' 70 Fourth, the Sentencing Guidelines ac-
knowledge that multiple counts of an offense may be relevant to a
sentence. 171 When multiple counts against the offender do not neces-
sarily represent multiple harms-for example, when the prosecutor
elects to charge several counts of drug distribution rather than charge
one large conspiracy-the Sentencing Guidelines require adjustments
163. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINI-
MUM PENALTIES IN "-sE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20-21 (1991) [hereinafter SPECIAL
REPORT]. The Sentencing Guidelines are much too intricate for a comprehensive description in
this Note. The manual itself is well over 400 pages in length. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 26.
164. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 163, at 20-21.
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to the offense level so that only the amount of harm caused by the
offender is reflected in the punishment. The sheer number of counts
that the prosecutor chooses to charge does not become the ultimate
factor. 172 The fifth step in the process is for the court to assess the
offender's acceptance of responsibility. 173 For example, the judge may
reduce the offense level by two "[i]f the defendant clearly demon-
strates acceptance of responsibility for his offense."'1 74 These five
steps complete the calculation of the offense level, which is shown as a
vertical axis on the Sentencing Guidelines matrix. 175
Next the court examines the criminal history of the offender. 76
Criminal history points are assigned to account for the offender's prior
criminal activity.177 Logically, more points are awarded if the prior
criminal activity included serious offenses requiring incarceration than
if it included minor offenses requiring mere probation. 178 This section
also awards more points for special patterns of criminal conduct-for
example, multiple felony convictions involving violence and con-
trolled substances. 179 After the criminal history points are totalled,
the offender is assigned a criminal history category from I to VI.
Finally, the federal judge uses the Sentencing Guidelines matrix to
determine the sentencing range for the offender. The criminal history
categories are listed on the horizontal axis of the matrix to coincide
with the offense levels on the vertical axis.180 The judge simply
matches the offense level and the criminal history category on the grid
and arrives at the applicable sentencing range.' 81
B. Why the Sentencing Guidelines Should Be Applied in the
Context of Federal Civil Forfeiture
Even though the Sentencing Guidelines were designed and origi-
nally implemented for use in the federal criminal justice system, 182
they should also be applied in proportionality review of federal civil
forfeitures. The Sentencing Guidelines should be considered in these
civil cases because the Sentencing Guidelines were developed with
172. Id at 22-23.
173. Id. at 23.
174. SENTENCING GUMELINES, supra note 26, § 3E1.1(a).
175. See id. at Sentencing Table (back inside cover).




180. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 26, Sentencing Table (back inside cover).
181. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 163, at 25.
182. See supra note 157.
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
proportionality in mind. Furthermore, application of the Sentencing
Guidelines can add to the relative objectivity of judicial proportional-
ity review.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which provided for the es-
tablishment of the Sentencing Guidelines, was enacted to satisfy cer-
tain objectives. 183  One important objective was to achieve
"proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appro-
priately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing sever-
ity."'1 84  Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines meticulously list
proportionate sentences for all federal offenses. 185 Of course, in-
cluded in this list are the various examples of federal drug offenses.
86
Because the first Solem factor requires that courts compare the grav-
ity of the underlying offense to the harshness of the imposed penalty,
federal courts reviewing civil seizures pursuant to § 881(a)(4) or (a)(7)
must somehow calculate the gravity of the underlying drug offense.
Courts should be able to approximate the gravity of the offense in part
by looking to the proportional listings in the Sentencing Guidelines.
Moreover, the Sentencing Guidelines can be used in proportional-
ity review of federal civil forfeitures in order to address the arguably
legitimate concern of subjectivity in judicial review. Some judges have
expressed concern that proportionality review in criminal proceedings
requires judges to perform subjective tasks that are better left to the
legislature. 187 Indeed, Justice Kennedy recognized in Harmelin that
proportionality review by federal courts should utilize "objective fac-
tors to the maximum possible extent."'188 Because proportionality re-
view in civil proceedings would seem to require the use of a similar
element of subjectivity, objective tools should be applied as much as
possible. The Sentencing Guidelines are such a tool. The Sentencing
Guidelines are not a product of the judiciary, but rather are ultimately
183. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 2.
184. Id. (emphasis added). Congress' other objectives were to achieve honesty and reason-
able uniformity in sentencing. Id.
185. Id. at 9.
186. Id. §§ 2D1.1 - 2D3.2.
187. For example, in Solem, Chief Justice Burger dissented and commented that, "[this] con-
clusion by five Justices that they are able to say that one offense has less 'gravity' than another is
nothing other than a bald substitution of individual subjective moral values for those of the
legislature." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 314 (1983). See also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 988 (1991) ("The difficulty of assessing gravity [of the offense] is demonstrated in the very
context of [the Harmelin case].").
188. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)).
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a product of the legislature. 8 9 Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines can
serve as an objective guide-the collective judgment of the members
of the United States Sentencing Commission-to follow when at-
tempting to approximate the gravity of the offense.
C. How the Sentencing Guidelines Can Be Applied in the Context
of Federal Civil Forfeiture
Both subsections, § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), target violators of fed-
eral drug laws who also own property. Section 881(a)(4) allows the
federal government to seize all aircraft, vehicles, or vessels which are
used in the illegal drug trade.' ° Additionally, § 881(a)(7) allows the
federal government to seize all real property used in the commission
of drug crimes.' 9 ' Because both subsections are expressly tied to the
commission of drug offenses, the drug offense section of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines should prove helpful in analyzing the first prong of the
Solem proportionality analysis-whether the harshness of the seizure
outweighs the gravity of the property owner's culpable conduct.192 A
federal court reviewing a seizure under either subsection should be
able to use the base offense levels listed in the Sentencing Guide-
lines'93 when trying to determine the gravity or "value" of the prop-
erty owner's culpable conduct. For example, a court can determine if
the sale of ten grams of hashish oil by the owner of seized property is
a relatively minor or major drug offense.'
94
The court can also look to the adjustments included in the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. 95 The court could account for particular vulnera-
bility on the part of the victim, an organizational or leadership role
that the offender played in the commission of the offense, the of-
fender's obstruction of justice, the existence of multiple offense
counts, or even acceptance of responsibility on the part of the of-
fender.196 In addition, the court can examine the Sentencing Guide-
189. Congress provided for the development of the Sentencing Guidelines in the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984. 18 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988). In addition, Congress reviewed the Sentencing
Guidelines proposed by the United States Sentencing Commission and continues to review all
newly proposed amendments. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 1-2.
190. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988).
191. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
192. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983).
193. See supra text accompanying note 165.
194. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 26, § 2D1.1.
195. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 163, at 22 ("[A]djustments act to further individualize the
sentence.... [A]djustments require the court to consider the defendant's role in the offense.").
196. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs, supra note 26, §§ 3A1.1 - 3E1.1. See also United States v.
Myers, 21 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[A] proportionality analysis requires a fact-specific
evaluation of all of the circumstances of the defendant's criminal conduct, including the extent of
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lines to determine the effect of the offender's criminal history (or lack
of criminal history) on the gravity of the underlying conduct. 197 Each
of these aspects of the Sentencing Guidelines can be used to determine
if there is an inference of gross disproportionality. 198
The Sentencing Guidelines can also help federal courts in analyz-
ing the second and third Solem factors, if needed. Under the second
Solem factor, a court may need to compare the sentence imposed on
the defendant before the court to the sentences imposed on other de-
fendants in the same jurisdiction. 199 This factor can easily be modified
to apply to the civil forfeiture context. With forfeiture, the court
would compare the value of the property seized from the civil defend-
ant before the court to the value of the property seized from other
forfeiture defendants in the same jurisdiction. The Sentencing Guide-
lines can assist the court with this Solem factor just as they assisted
with the first factor.
For example, a court may decide that the seizure of $700,000
worth of property for the commission of a Level 6 drug offense (i.e.,
the sale of less than 250 grams of marijuana) 200 is excessive when com-
pared to another court's ruling, in the same jurisdiction, that the
seizure of $600,000 worth of property for the commission of a Level 8
drug offense (i.e., the sale of 300 grams of marijuana) 20 1 was unconsti-
tutionally excessive. On the other hand, other factors may lead the
court to find the seizure of the $700,000 property not to be excessive:
factors such as a significant criminal history or obstruction of justice.
A court may also use the Sentencing Guidelines to analyze the
third Solem factor. Under the third factor, a court may compare the
sentence imposed on the defendant before the court to the sentences
imposed on defendants for the same or similar conduct in other juris-
dictions. 2°2 In the civil forfeiture context, this would mean that a
court would compare the value of the property seized in the case
a defendant's criminal drug activities and the amount of time that the defendant conducted those
activities, in order to determine whether the forfeiture was unconstitutionally 'excessive."') (cit-
ing Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2775-76 (1993)).
197. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 26, §§ 4A1.1 - 4B1.4. See also SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 163, at 24 ("Because a defendant's prior record is relevant to such important sentenc-
ing goals as general deterrence ... [and] just punishment .... the guidelines evaluate criminal
history with some care and complexity.").
198. See supra text accompanying notes 127-31.
199. See supra text accompanying note 107.
200. See SENTmNNo GUIDELINES, supra note 26, § 2D1.1.
201. 1&
202. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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before the court to the value of the property seized in other jurisdic-
tions for the same or similar conduct.
For example, the federal government seizure of a $5,000 car for
the commission of a Level 6 federal drug offense could be compared
to a state government seizure of a $10,000 car for the commission of
the same general offense, the sale of less than 250 grams of marijuana.
If the state judiciary had found that the $10,000 seizure was not exces-
sive, the federal court could consider this decision when ruling on the
constitutionality of the $5,000 seizure.
In United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive,20 3 the Second Circuit
used the Sentencing Guidelines in its review of the third Solem prong
in a civil forfeiture case.
Further, the punishments meted out by the federal government and
other jurisdictions for similar crimes indicate that the forfeiture of
[the offender's] condominium is not aberrational. Federal law au-
thorizes a sentence of twenty years and a fine of $1,000,000 for the
distribution of cocaine in an amount less than 500 grams .... The
Sentencing Guidelines assign a Base Offense Level of 12 to transac-
tions involving less than 25 grams of cocaine. Depending upon
criminal history, a defendant who had distributed the same amount
of cocaine as [the offender] would presumptively be fined $30,000
and receive a sentence of 10 to 37 months. The state courts in this
circuit authorize punishments on a similar scale .... We recognize
that these are merely possible sentences and are not conclusive as to
what a court might do in an individual case. Nonetheless, we infer
from the statutes that the imposition of the equivalent of a $68,000
fine in this case, while large, is not a grossly disproportionate pun-
ishment within the meaning of Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence.2o4
Again, under the McGruder interpretation of Harmelin and Solem,
the second and third Solem factors only need to be reviewed if the
first factor provides an inference of gross disproportionality.2 5 But
these factors, particularly when used in combination with the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines as the Whalers Cove court used them, provide rela-
tively objective criteria for federal courts to consider when deciding
whether a given civil forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive.
CONCLUSION
With Austin, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear
that civil seizures of property are generally fines, and are therefore
203. United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
204. Id. at 39.
205. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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subject to Eighth Amendment review. Yet, the Court did not ex-
pressly tell the lower courts how such review should be conducted.
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, however, provides insight. The
opinion is based on the notion that civil forfeitures generally serve to
punish the property owner. Accordingly, the standard for determin-
ing whether a given civil forfeiture is an Excessive Fine should be sim-
ilar to the standard already used by the courts in Cruel and Unusual
Punishment reviews. A civil seizure is excessive, and therefore uncon-
stitutional, if the value of the seized property is grossly disproportion-
ate to the property owner's culpable conduct.
When attempting to weigh the property owner's conduct against
the dollar value of the seized property, courts should use objective
criteria as much as possible. In the federal arena, the judiciary can use
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as an analytical tool to place an ap-
proximate value or weight on the property owner's culpable conduct.
This "value" can then be more readily compared to the value of the
seized property. Thus, although the Sentencing Guidelines were origi-
nally designed and implemented for use in the criminal law, they can
be of assistance to federal courts conducting Eighth Amendment re-
view of civil forfeitures in the wake of Austin v. United States.
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